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Introduction
The idea of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) inNortheast Asia has been flourishing for the last decade. Twoprominent models have been proposed: one by John Endicott1
and the other by Kumao Kaneko.2 They put forward several important
features: e.g., to cover a wide area of around 2,000 kilometers from the
center of the Korean peninsula; to envision multiple membership having
major nuclear powers in the region; and to tackle a missile issue in the
case of Kaneko’s proposal. Aspirations for making an enduring and
peaceful NWFZ of this region have been partly encouraged by growing
international interests in and efforts for nonproliferation and nuclear
disarmament.
In the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, such aspirations have been
materialized in several parts of the region. As a harbinger, the Treaty of
Rarotonga was signed in 1985 to make South Pacific immune from
nuclear threat. Next, New Zealand unilaterally declared itself nuclear
free in 1987. This was followed by Mongolia in 1992 and its nuclear
free status later got a formal recognition from the U.N. General
Assembly. And the Bangkok Treaty was signed in 1995 to make the
Southeast Asian region nuclear free. The treaty was put into force in
1 See Background Data: Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia, 2nd
Meeting of the Expanded Senior Panel, October 12-14, 1996, Bordeaux, France.
2 See Outline of a “Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty“ by Kumao
Kaneko, October 1999; Kumao Kaneko, “Japan needs no umbrella,” The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, March/April 1996, pp. 46-51
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1997. Thus, the forces of creating a NWFZ had started in South Pacific
and have been gradually moving up toward the North. So it is natural
and reasonable to envision that the next turn would be Northeast Asia.
A third proposal was made by Seongwhun Cheon and Tatsujiro
Suzuki to establish a NWFZ among North and South Korea, and Japan.3
The motivation of the tripartite NWFZ (TNWFZ) is based on the
recognition that the previous proposals are too ambitious to bear fruitful
results in a foreseeable future. By including nuclear weapon states, they
put in front sensitive security issues of redeploying and dismantling
nuclear weapons in the very beginning of what might have to be a long
cooperative process. Taking difficult issues at the start will no doubt
bring about many hurdles in the process. With this in mind, the TNWFZ
attempts to realize a NWFZ in Northeast Asia gradually—not necessarily
belatedly—by taking into account the feasibility and by avoiding
difficulties posed by larger NWFZ proposals. In fact, the TNWFZ can
be an intermediate, practical, and hopefully, faster step to reach a full
NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
Achievements of the LNWFZ-NEA
Up until today, most international efforts on turning Northeast Asia
into a nuclear weapon free zone have gathered under the initiative of
John Endicott, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Under
Dr. Endicott’s leadership, a group of specialists from China, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States has held meetings every
year since January 1995 to consider the feasibility of a limited nuclear
weapons free zone for Northeast Asia. As time goes, the original core
group has been joined by interested parties from other nations including
Argentina, Canada, Finland, France. This group’s proposal has been
dubbed LNWFZ-NEA (Limited Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in
Northeast Asia).
3 Seongwhun Cheon and Tatsujiro Suzuki, “A nuclear-free zone in Korea and Japan,“
Korea Herald, June 13, 2000, p. 6. The idea of creating a NWFZ among the three nations
was first put forward by Hiromichi Umebayashi at INESAP Conference in Sweden in
1996. See Hiro Umebayashi, “A Northeast Asia NWFZ: a realistic and attainable goal,“
INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 10, August 1996. The proposal was called “A Trilateral
Treaty with NSA Proposals“ and was renamed as “A Three plus Three Nations
Arrangement“ in 2000.
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The initiative for LNWFZ-NEA was prompted by the significant
changes in the structure of the international system since the beginning
of the 1990s.4 That is, the need to create a cooperative security
infrastructure became visible in the region that had enduring legacies of
colonialism, World War II, and the Cold War.  So it was believed that it
was clearly a right time to move forward by recognizing that the security
environment in the region could be made increasingly positive by
multilateral action, and by this action to head for a new level of regional
interaction. The idea of LNWFZ-NEA was put forward as a means to
accomplish this change from confrontation to cooperation in the new
era.
At a meeting held in Buenos Aires on March 21, 1996, the
participants agreed on the following positions that have been important
guidelines for the international efforts toward establishing the LNWFZ-
NEA.5
1.A LNWFZ for Northeast Asia could become an important step in
the creation of a new cooperative security system in the region.
2.Such a LNWFZ would not be oriented against any one state.
3.The geographical extent of the zone would need to be examined
further, but the concept involves the following countries: China,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.
4.A time-phased approach to implementation of weapons included
for relocation or removal from the zone would have to be allowed.
5.Emphasis would be placed on nuclear weapons not associated with
strategic arms.
6.The LNWFZ would not place restrictions on peaceful applications
for power generation, but safeguard inspections would continue.
7.Membership should include all interested states of the region with
original members, inviting others in the region to join as well as all
nuclear weapon states. It is envisaged that the following states
4 John Endicott, “Existing criteria for nuclear weapons-free zones and the limited
nuclear weapons-free zone concept for Northeast Asia,“A Report by the Chairman of
the Interim Secretariat Regarding Efforts to Create a Cooperative Security Regime in
Northeast Asia, at Hakone Japan in October 1999, p. 5.
5 Final Statement of the Buenos Aires Group: Findings and Recommendations of the
Buenos Aires Group Regarding a Limited Nuclear Weapons Zone (LNWFZ) for
Northeast Asia. The Bordeaux Protocol of the Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for
Northeast Asia, Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy at the Georgia
Institute of Technology, March 1997, pp. 79-81.
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would be original members: China, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Russia and the United States.
8.The creation of a specific nuclear weapons free zone was not seen
as the ultimate goal, only the first step toward major reductions in
nuclear armaments worldwide.
A year later in 1997, the Expanded Panel meeting was held in
Bordeaux France. The Bordeaux meeting reached an agreement on the
action agenda. In particular, the following items are noteworthy:6
1. Endorse the creation of national working groups, who would
complete studies in concert with applicable government circles,
concerning individual components of the LNWFZ concept,
including zone size and shape, specific weapon systems to be
contained, verification system, agency structure, and appropriate
confidence building measures.
2. Establish formal contact-point relationships with government
representatives.
3. Examine the concept of reciprocity to insure proportionality in
any actual weapons reduction.
4. Inform the two non-regional nuclear powers (the United Kingdom
and France) of the activities and, as developments advance, prepare
to offer them observer status in preparation to full adherence.
5. Adopt an overall concept with regard to the notion of a cooperative
security regime that stressed how the regime activities would not
be harmful to any of the states and would improve or add to mutual
trust.
From the beginning, the focus has been on the two specific points.
The first was the creation of a specific circular zone from which all
nuclear weapons would be removed. And the second, the creation of a
regional agency to verify that the agreed nuclear weapons had indeed
been removed, and that nuclear weapons were not being possessed by
the non-nuclear nations within the zone.
In any nuclear weapon free zone proposal, a key issue is how to
define the zone of application. The Expanded Senior Panel, a core
discussion group of the LNWFZ-NEA has identified, at its meeting in
6 The Bordeaux Protocol of the Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast
Asia, Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy at the Georgia Institute of
Technology, March 1997, pp. 23-24.
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Seoul, October 2001, the following four designs to delimit the zone in
which the agreement will be implemented.7
• Circle Zone:  A zone in which the center is placed at the center
of the DMZ on the Korean Peninsula. The radius of the zone would
be about 1200 nm and would involve the following areas: China
including Taiwan, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea,
Russia, and the United States. Here the United States is not
physically within the zone but it will be expected to actively
participate within the system.
• Ellipse Zone:  This zone would have its western border located
in Northeast China and its Eastern border in Alaska, thus, visibly
involving three major nuclear weapon states. North and South
Korea, Japan and Taiwan are within the ellipse zone. While the
exact boundaries crossing Russia, China, Mongolia and the United
States have yet to be defined, the concept would include some
territory of all members in the zone.
• North-Pacific Zone: This zone is based on the notion that while
certain areas within the North-Pacific, i.e. a portion or entire
territories of China, Russia, Alaska (the United States), Japan,
the Korean Peninsula, and Mongolia would initially be in a non-
nuclear zone, the oceans and seas between the territories affected
would be excluded. This is designed to remove a very difficult
verification issue involving SLBMs of the three nuclear member
states.
• NEA League of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and Prototype Plan
for Involvement of Regional Nuclear Weapon States: This NEA
League proposes that Japan, North and South Korea, and Mongolia
would join in the formation of a league of non-nuclear weapon
states. This could be realized immediately or upon the agreement
of the nuclear weapons states to each identify one military base
with tactical nuclear weapons present.  These steps would form
the basis to create the inspection system, agency structure, etc.
and other features for an initial demonstration system.
Regarding the nuclear weapons permitted within the zone, the
Expanded Senior Panel noted that although it is the ultimate goal of this
7 Expanded Senior Panel’s Deliberations at the Meeting of Expanded Senior Panel for
Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia held On October 8-9th, 2001 at
Swiss Grand Hotel, Seoul, South Korea.
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agreement to realize the removal of all nuclear warheads from the areas
included in the zone, such an objective can only come after a period of
confidence building, dialogue, and developing a record of success in this
area among the states of the region.8 So the Panel has focused on
identifying nuclear weapons appropriate for reduction at the initial steps.
It recommends that during the initial stages of LNWFZ-NEA, the
emphasis be placed on nuclear warheads applicable to non-strategic
missiles and other nuclear warheads or devices with tactical applications.
Limits of the LNWFZ-NEA proposal
In the discussion on creating a nuclear weapon free zone, the two
questions are typically raised; whether the idea is desirable and whether
it is feasible. For the issue of desirability, no objection could be made
against a nuclear weapon free zone. The ultimate goal of a nuclear weapon
free zone—to eliminate all nuclear weapons and achieve stable peace in
the region—is worth a sincere pursuit. On the other hand, there exist
many reservations as to the second question of feasibility. The idea of
tripartite NWFZ mentioned above draws on such reservations.
There exist two very practical reasons behind these reservations.
First, LNWFZ-NEA mixes two categorically different status of
membership of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): nuclear weapon states
(NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This is a unique feature
of LNWFZ-NEA and what makes its implementation most challenging.
With the mixture of NWS and NNWS, LNWFZ-NEA brings about
doubly heavy burdens; that is, not only creating a NWFZ among non-
nuclear weapon states that is a traditional mission of any NWFZ but
also making parts of NWS territories nuclear-free and carrying out
reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. It is suspected whether nuclear
arms reduction among the three nuclear weapon states in Northeast
Asia can be negotiated and conducted in parallel with a nuclear weapon
free zone among the non-nuclear weapon states. It seems possible
theoretically or at the first glance. But with some second thoughts, it is
easily understood how difficult it would be to combine the two already
immensely difficult jobs. It is more plausible that either a nuclear
disarmament among nuclear weapon states or a nuclear weapon free
zone among non-nuclear weapon states come first.
8 Ibid.
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Secondly, the current LNWFZ-NEA lacks a clear-cut objective.
In the Expanded Panel’s deliberations, there are some phrases that reflect
what the LNWFZ-NEA is trying to achieve; for example, “to create a
new cooperative security system,” “to support enhanced transparency,
dialogue and confidence between all the parties,” and “the ultimate goal
to realize the removal of all nuclear weapons.”9 These are, however,
just expressions of principles with no practical details. In order to draw
as much support and interests from the regional countries as possible, it
is important that any idea of establishing a NWFZ harbors clear-cut and
realistic objectives that could provide some tangible benefits to the
member states.
Each country has its own objectives and they are not necessarily
overlapping. Then, the question comes on how much common ground
is shared by the countries working for the LNWFZ-NEA. If there exist
significant differences between their objectives, the prospect of the
LNWFZ-NEA would be as much not bright. The Beijing Summary
Report that categorizes various proposals in three baskets demonstrates
the wide spectrum of issues expected to cover within the context of the
LNWFZ in Northeast Asia.10 In consequence, this report manifests the
fact that the objectives of the LNWFZ-NEA are not well defined and
members’ interests are diverse and dispersed.
Objectives of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia
Moving toward creating a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, it is important
to build consensus on what are the objectives to be attained in the first
place. Unless we share common understandings on the role and function
of a NWFZ in this region, ongoing efforts for a NWFZ in Northeast
Asia would not achieve a successful result. There are three objectives
that should be unanimously shared by member states of the LNWFZ-
NEA.
They are not mutually exclusive, more or less interrelated. The three
objectives are (1) to enhance transparency of the countries’ nuclear
intentions and activities in the region, (2) to promote prosperity by
9 Expanded Senior Panel’s Deliberations at the Meeting of Expanded Senior Panel for
Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia held On October 8-9th, 2001 at
Swiss Grand Hotel, Seoul, South Korea.
10 “Beijing Summary Report,“ Sixth Expanded Senior Panel on the Limited Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia, September 16-20, 2000.
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allowing active cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
(3) to strengthen peace and security with a verifiable NWFZ supported
by firm security assurances and nuclear disarmament from the part of
nuclear weapon states. The first two objectives are characteristically
important in the fact that Japan and South Korea are heavily dependent
on nuclear energy and that North Korea will be in a similar situation in
its industrialization process in the future. The third objective is also
prominent for the benefit of guaranteeing more stable peace and security
in the region where both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon
states live together. A NWFZ can be an effective tool to achieve peace
not only by preventing non-nuclear weapon states from the possession
of nuclear weapons of all kinds and but also by having nuclear weapon
states provide firm security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states
and commit to nuclear disarmament for regional stability and peace.
The road ahead
For the successful conclusion of ongoing efforts for the LNWFZ-
NEA, at least, two measures need be taken in the future. Firstly, nuclear
strategies of nuclear weapon states should be an important part of
discussions about a NWFZ. Because redeployment or reduction of some
nuclear weapons for a NWFZ will lead to having significant effects on
nuclear weapon states’ overall security strategies and nuclear strategies
in particular. It is surprising that there have been little discussions on
the nuclear doctrines and deterrence strategies of the three nuclear
weapon states in the context of LNWFZ-NEA.
Therefore, it is important to hold a forum with the purpose of
discussing nuclear policies and deterrent strategies of the nuclear weapon
states and of coordinating their nuclear policies in possible areas. For
example, if a comprehensive security assurance is to be agreed, nuclear
weapon states have to adopt no-first-use policy against non-nuclear
weapon states. Only China has held such policy at the moment. But
North Korea, for instance, has strongly demanded no nuclear-threat
from the United States that is more far-reaching than ‘no-use’ guarantee.
It is necessary, therefore, to check whether other nuclear weapon states
are willing to modify their nuclear policies for the sake of establishing a
NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
Secondly, some measures are also necessary to demonstrate that a
multilateral gathering like Expanded Panel is beneficial in itself for
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regional peace and stability. Without tangible evidence that multilateral
gathering are achieving some success, however modest, external support
and interests would diminish in the future. One way to bring about
positive evidence is to launch a practical and easy-to-implement project,
symbolizing cooperative security in the region. For example, multilateral
monitoring of seismic activities or regional monitoring of environmental
pollution can be launched as small-scale technical projects.11 That is, a
simultaneous move in the LNWFZ track and in the cooperative project
track should be the way forward for increasing a possibility of a NWFZ
in Northeast Asia.
A NWFZ in Northeast Asia is not an end in itself. It is merely a
beginning and opens a new way for strengthening peace and prosperity
in the region. Regional endeavors to establish a NWFZ are fit for the
concept of cooperative security.
Cooperative security in the 21st century, as opposed to collective
security of the Cold War era, envisions cooperative engagement as a
strategic principle and emphasizes the importance of institutionalized
consents.12 At the practical level, cooperative security seeks to devise
agreed-on measures to prevent war and to do so by preventing the means
for successful aggression from being assembled. Regional security
cooperation, international arms control treaties and international
measures to enhance transparency and increase openness in nations’
military postures and strategies are all means to achieve cooperative
security. That is, cooperative security is a model of international relations
in which disputes are expected to occur but within the limits of agreed
upon norms and established procedures.
A NWFZ in Northeast Asia is an effective arrangement to carry
out the following principal aims of cooperative security in this region:
(1) to prevent large-scale military offensive capabilities; (2) to engage
cooperatively with internationally accepted norms and rules; and (3) to
foster regional security cooperation. Successful achievement of a NWFZ
11 The Cooperative Monitoring Center at Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is a
branch of the Sandia National Laboratories, has focused on launching small-scale technical
projects among the adversarial regional parties for the purpose of building mutual trust
and maintaining stable peace. Its works are available at http://www.cmc.sandia.gov
12 See Janne Nolan, “The concept of cooperative security,“ in Janne Nolan, ed., Global
Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 3-18.
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will and should be followed by extending membership and broadening
coverage.
In the long run, it is hoped that a NWFZ in Northeast Asia should
become a basis for Pan-Pacific nuclear weapon free zone (PPNWFZ),
encompassing East Asia, South Pacific and Latin America. In the future,
the PPNWFZ could be turned into a Pan-Pacific Peace Zone (PPPZ),
reaching the end of the long journey probing peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region.
